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Current intrusion detection systems (IDS) for industrial con-
trol systems (ICS) mostly involve the retrofitting of conven-
tional network IDSs, such as SNORT. Such an approach is
prone to missing highly targeted and specific attacks against
ICS. Where ICS-specific approaches exist, they often rely
on passive network monitoring techniques, offering a low
cost solution, and avoiding any computational overhead aris-
ing from actively polling ICS devices. However, the use of
passive approaches alone could fail in the detection of at-
tacks that alter the behaviour of ICS devices (as was the
case in Stuxnet). Where active solutions exist, they can be
resource-intensive, posing the risk of overloading legacy de-
vices which are commonplace in ICSs. In this paper we aim
to overcome these challenges through the combination of a
passive network monitoring approach, and selective active
monitoring based on attack vectors specific to an ICS con-
text. We present the implementation of our IDS, SENAMI,
for use with Siemens S7 devices. We evaluate the effective-
ness of SENAMI in a comprehensive testbed environment,
demonstrating validity of the proposed approach through
the detection of purely passive attacks at a rate of 99%, and
active value tampering attacks at a rate of 81-93%. Cru-
cially, we reach recall values greater than 0.96, indicating
few attack scenarios generating false negatives.
Keywords
Industrial Control Systems; Intrusion Detection Systems;
Active Monitoring
1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are networks of devices
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responsible for the monitoring, control, and automation of
a physical process. Applied across a range of sectors, from
water treatment to energy generation and oil refinery, some
ICSs are considered part of national critical infrastructure.
Historically, ICS were deployed on networks isolated from
the Internet, however, more and more ICS are now found on
public IP addresses, as demonstrated by various reports such
as project SHINE [13]. Systems that are not directly accessi-
ble are also under threat, as shown by a range of high-profile
attacks such as Stuxnet, the German Steel Mill disaster, and
the recent attack on the Ukrainian power grid [8, 15, 21].
The increasing severity and likelihood of network-based
attacks has resulted in the deployment of Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (IDS) across most large-scale IT infrastruc-
tures [5]. However, within the context of ICS, we see a lack
of bespoke IDS offerings. A number of commercial offerings
involve retrofitting existing network intrusion detection sys-
tems (NIDS), e.g., SNORT, to ICS settings [1]. While this
approach has its benefits, sophisticated attacks often exploit
specific characteristics and patterns of operation within ICS
environments, that do not necessarily manifest as network
anomalies [12, 16].
A number of works have attempted to address this limi-
tation through the design of ICS-specific IDSs. For exam-
ple, [9, 12, 22] are based on passive monitoring of network
traffic to and from PLCs. Passive monitoring techniques
induce minimal overhead and require little adaptation of
the monitored networks. However, targeted attacks that
covertly alter the behaviour of a compromised PLC are hard
to detect using passive monitoring only, as they leave little
to no traces on the network. On the other hand, active
monitoring of PLC variables allows us to detect tamper-
ing even if the attack is not visible on the network [2, 19].
However, this comes at the cost of additional polling on the
target PLC, which can become computationally expensive
on resource-constrained legacy systems.
In this paper, we investigate a hybrid IDS exploiting the
best of both worlds. We demonstrate that a number of
advanced ICS-specific attacks can be detected through a
largely passive solution, with additional selective active mon-
itoring of highly contextualised PLC variables. We refer to
this active monitoring as selective, non-invasive, active mon-
itoring, where polling of unnecessarily high number of or
contextually redundant values is avoided. We demonstrate
the implementation of our approach in the form of SENAMI:
a selective, non-invasive, active monitoring IDS for systems
based on Siemens S7 devices. We evaluate the effectiveness
of SENAMI in Lancaster’s comprehensive ICS testbed [10,
20]. Our evaluation demonstrates that SENAMI is able to
detect purely passive attacks at a rate of 99%, and active
value tampering attacks at a rate of 81-93%. Crucially, we
reach recall values greater than 0.96, indicating few attack
scenarios generating false negatives.
The novel contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We introduce the notion of selective, non-invasive, ac-
tive monitoring as a means for detection of targeted
attacks aimed at covertly altering the behaviour of
PLCs, without introducing noticeable computational
overhead and while controlling the network overhead.
• We provide a practical implementation of this concept
in SENAMI, an IDS for Siemens S7 control systems.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of such an approach
through evaluation of SENAMI against a range of at-
tack scenarios in a realistic water treatment testbed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses existing research on intrusion detection within
the context of ICS, highlighting the need for selective, non-
invasive, active monitoring. Section 3 discusses four key at-
tack scenarios, motivating the use of our proposed approach.
Section 4 presents the implementation of SENAMI. Section 5
describes the results of evaluating SENAMI against a range
of attacks in our ICS testbed. Section 6 reflects on the results
of the evaluation, discussing the strengths and weaknesses of
selective, non-invasive, active monitoring, and limitations of
SENAMI’s implementation. Section 7 concludes the paper
and identifies directions for future work.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Mahan et al. [16] discuss the pros and cons of adapting
existing NIDS vs. crafting ICS-specific intrusion detection
systems, highlighting the need for the latter. McLaughlin
et al. [17] introduce the notion of security enclaves, group-
ings of systems with common security policies, as a basis for
cost-effectively combining a range of existing general pur-
pose solutions. They highlight the lack of specificity as a
key problem of such a general purpose reuse approach.
Gonzalez and Papa [9] propose an IDS for passive moni-
toring of Modbus. Intrusions are detected through the in-
spection of captured Modbus packets, and maintaining a
table of states for the PLCs and other devices monitored by
the system. This approach is based on the often fixed and
predictable patterns of behaviour within ICS networks.
Strohmeier et al. [22] discuss passive intrusion detection
for unmanned planes. They describe a method of measur-
ing the Received Signal Strength (RSS) of messages, as an
airplane’s signal will vary during flight, while an attacker is
likely to remain stationary, and therefore have a constant
RSS. This approach applies machine learning techniques to
the characterisation of normal level variation.
Caselli et al. [4] discuss the limitations of existing NIDS to
detect semantic attacks similar to Stuxnet. They highlight
a specific attack based on legitimate messages that may be
sent out of normal sequence or at malicious times and would
nevertheless be accepted as valid event sequences by the
system and existing NIDS. They go on to propose an IDS
to support sequence-aware intrusion detection (S-IDS).
McLaughlin and McDaniel [18] discuss SABOT, a tool
that generates semi-automated attack vectors for PLCs with-
out knowledge of the PLC’s internals. The attacker provides
a high-level description of the control system’s behaviour, in-
cluding declaration of plant devices, and a set of properties
describing the behaviour of each. SABOT then downloads
(in ICS parlance uploads1) and decompiles the PLC’s logic
bytecode and seeks to use the aforementioned descriptions to
generate a mapping between the identified variables and the
(attacker-defined) devices they control (e.g., pump, valve,
etc.). This provides enough information about the inter-
nal state of the PLC so that malicious code attacks can be
launched against those PLC-internal variables identified as
weak.
The aforementioned passive solutions can be used to spot
generally suspicious behaviour as well as more specific at-
tack vectors, like uploads of PLC logic code. However, such
approaches cannot readily detect attacks aimed at altering
the behaviour of PLCs. Nicholson et al. [19] propose an
active monitoring approach to detect attacks by monitor-
ing the values of a PLC’s internal variables. This provides
an effective PLC-based detection of attacks, albeit at the
expense of monitoring a large number of internal variables.
The core concern with this approach relates to the age of
devices and computational resource available in ICS envi-
ronments. Devices can be decades old, running protocols
designed as early as the 1970s. Therefore, an intensive mon-
itoring approach can be computationally expensive and risks
overloading legacy or resource-constrained devices [2].
Our approach aims to leverage the lack of computational
overhead seen through passive traffic analysis, while enrich-
ing it with selective, active monitoring of a few highly con-
textualised PLC variables. This selective, non-invasive, ac-
tive monitoring is aimed at honing the specificity of intru-
sion detection, while reducing the computational overhead
on devices, hence eliminating the need for scheduling [2].
3. ATTACK SCENARIOS
In this work, we focus on the detection of attacks involv-
ing an individual PLC in a local network, as depicted in
Figure 1. We assume that an attacker has already entered
the network (preventing such network intrusions is out of
the scope of this paper). We do not consider the case where
the attacker would have physical access to the PLC: such
a situation opens up a whole new range of attacks includ-
ing firmware compromise and physical tampering, which are
out of our scope. For similar reasons, we also do not take
insider threats into account. We consider four scenarios, and
for each of these, we discuss the theoretical applicability of
passive and active monitoring techniques.
3.1 Scenario 1: Reconnaissance
An attacker getting a foothold in a network will likely
perform reconnaissance scans to identify potential targets,
using, for instance, plcscan [6]. Although such scans are gen-
erally harmless, detecting them – through passive monitor-
1In ICS terminology, a download of logic code is referred
to as an upload. We will follow this convention from here
onwards.
Figure 1: The infrastructure under attack.
ing of network activity – is key to identifying compromised
assets and stopping the attacker’s lateral movement in the
network.
3.2 Scenario 2: Denial of Service
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks comprise flooding a target
with traffic. In this paper, we also consider a variant attack
using a fuzzer [3]. Interestingly, DoS techniques can also be
used as a decoy to mask an attacker’s true intentions. An
attacker who can generate large amounts of traffic into the
ICS network, for instance, via a compromised machine, can
then generate endless logs that would dissimulate behaviour
that might otherwise seem suspicious (e.g., writing specific
PLC values to undermine processes, or reporting back sys-
tem states, cf. scenarios 3 and 4).
DoS attacks themselves are trivial to detect via passive
monitoring due to the amount of traffic they generate. Even
in the presence of a decoy DoS, a network-based attack –
cf. scenarios 1, 3 and 4.1 – would still generate noise in
the network. Specifically, if the IDS had knowledge of the
times at which legitimate packets usually arrive, even a small
number of packets from a legitimate IP at anomalous times
can be detected. Arguably, such a task would be difficult to
perform manually under a decoy DoS.
3.3 Scenario 3: Exfiltration of logic code
Uploading logic code from a PLC to an engineering work-
station is a legitimate action. ICS engineers will often up-
load control logic to their workstations when making alter-
ations to process operations. These alterations can be minor
(e.g., altering control timers), or substantial (e.g., modifying
critical process thresholds). As highlighted by [18], control
logic can be utilised by an attacker for a variety of reasons,
including general reconnaissance and malware generation.
Irrespective of the attacker’s purpose, uploading control
logic from a PLC will generate network traffic, and a pas-
sive IDS should be able to detect this. With proper heuristic
comparison of the expected quantity, IP addresses, and tim-
ing of this traffic, it should be possible to detect whether
this action is expected or not.
3.4 Scenario 4: Tampering with monitoring
An attacker may choose to tamper with the values being
returned to devices responsible for remote alarm manage-
ment or data analytics, such as a Remote Terminal Unit
(RTU) and a Historian database, as shown in Figure 1. This
can blind or alter an operator’s perception of physical pro-
cess states, hiding malicious activity, potentially leading to
catastrophic failures [7]. For example, an attacker may alter
the PLC’s behaviour causing physical process change beyond
defined safe limits, while simultaneously adjusting values re-
turned to the RTU and Historian, blinding remote operators
to such changes. Tampering of this nature was applied in
the case of Stuxnet.
We consider three forms of tampering with the values
stored inside the PLC (scenarios where the attacker would
tamper with the logic of the PLC are out of scope):
• Scenario 4.1: via the network, the attacker overrides
monitoring values through write packets that can be
detected by passive monitoring. The write packets
would appear to come from a suspicious source (i.e.
an IP that is not supposed to issue such packets) or at
a suspicious time.
• Scenario 4.2: from a compromised PLC itself, its
logic overriding the monitoring values – in which case,
only active monitoring would be applicable, since no
network traffic is generated.
• Scenario 4.3: from a compromised PLC again, but
for very brief periods of time (“partial tampering”).
This reduces the effectiveness of the attack, due to
the refresh rate of the Data Block values. However,
if carried out persistently, it can cause damage to the
process underway and to the PLC itself, while being
more difficult to detect via active monitoring.
4. SENAMI: SELECTIVE, NON-INVASIVE,
ACTIVE MONITORING IDS
An overview of SENAMI is shown in Figure 2. As shown
in the figure, SENAMI focuses on the Siemens S7 protocol
and the Siemens SIMATIC S7 series PLCs. The reasons
behind our focus on the S7 protocol are twofold. Firstly,
our choice was driven by the real-world testbed environ-
ment described in [10, 20], configured to replicate PLC logic
practices we have previously observed in real-world ICS net-
works. Secondly, Siemens S7 PLCs were targeted by Stuxnet
[15], providing a realistic attack scenario to replicate with
regards to scenario 4 in Section 3.
It is worth noting there are two distinct versions of the S7
protocol, applied across varying SIMATIC S7 PLCs. SENA-
MI is concerned with the standard legacy version, used in
the majority of S7 control systems. This version of the S7
protocol is identified by the protocol ID “0x32” in the 62nd
byte of the S7 packet [14]. The work described in this paper
is, therefore, transferable across all Siemens PLCs using this
same S7 protocol version. The principle of selective, non-
invasive, active monitoring is applicable to the general field
of ICS security. However, specific implementations will be
required to support additional protocols.
The following sections discuss SENAMI’s implementation
of passive and active monitoring in more detail. One point
which should be noted is SENAMI’s ability to only monitor
one PLC at a time, discarding packets where neither the
source nor destination address matches that of the PLC.
To monitor a wider network, multiple instance of SENAMI
could be launched, with relevant PLC addressing applied
to each instance. Such a PLC-centric approach makes it
possible for SENAMI to scale to a complex ICS environ-
ment. For instance, in an environment with 6 PLC stations,
6 instances of SENAMI can be run, each fine-tuned to the
specific behaviour of each station.
4.1 Packet capturing and parsing
The passive monitoring components of SENAMI require a
means by which capturing and parsing of S7 packets can be
achieved. The S7 protocol (much like other popular ICS pro-
tocols) operates over TCP, specifically over port 102. Within
the TCP packet, the S7 packet is further encapsulated inside
TPKT and COTP packets, with the S7 packet being given
in the COTP PDU [14].
S7 is a request-response protocol, where requests are made
to the PLC, and responses are served back, indicated by
the ROSCTR field in the S7 header. There are multiple
function codes specifying the purpose of these request or
response packets. The function codes SENAMI is concerned
with monitoring are Read, Write, and the logic code uploads
(Start Upload, Upload, and End Upload). A packet will also
list a series of parameters, areas of memory from which it
is either requesting values, or to which it is writing values.
As discussed in Section 4.2, SENAMI’s passive component
is concerned with various properties of these packets.
Non-S7 packets also need to be considered. For example,
TCP Denial of Service attacks could be launched against the
PLC’s network interface. Given that S7 packets will account
for the majority of traffic within the scope of SENAMI, for
simplification, we do not parse such non-S7 packets on a
protocol-by-protocol basis. Instead, SENAMI classifies all
non-S7 packets as one type {“Other”} to be monitored.
These parsed and processed packets are passed onto the
heuristic (passive) analysis component of SENAMI.
4.2 Passive network traffic analysis
SENAMI utilises a set of heuristics to characterise a nor-
mal baseline for traffic within the ICS network. These heuris-
tics are derived from a representative period of network traf-
fic. Note that, while powerful passive NIDS exist, our fo-
cus here is on highlighting the general shortcomings of a
NIDS for ICS, particularly with regards to more advanced
attacks and when considering more general-purpose IDSs.
Therefore, we incorporate a generalised passive IDS within
SENAMI in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of a com-
bined active and passive approach. As shown in Figure 2,
there are four types of heuristic analyses:
• Quantity anomaly detection
• Time anomaly detection
• IP anomaly detection
• PLC logic code upload detection
The baseline for these heuristics is established by first run-
ning a packet capture over a representative segment of net-
work traffic (for instance, 2 hours). The capture generates
a file of aggregated data: IPs, packet count, time of arrival,
etc. sorted by function code. This data is then analysed by
an expert user (i.e. an ICS operator, preferably one with
some familiarity with how the IDS works) who uses it to fill
a reference configuration file for the IDS to use as a baseline.
4.2.1 Quantity anomaly detection
The set of identified heuristics are concerned with the
number of packets that arrive in a given time period be-
tween 2 points, for example, the number of S7 packets with
the Write function code that arrive between the PLC and a
particular workstation in 30 seconds.
With sufficient network traffic on which to define heuris-
tic baselines, SENAMI can establish a reasonably robust
estimate of which quantity represents a normal traffic for
each packet type, and which thresholds define low and high
traffics. The module then tags each time period with the
corresponding traffic levels: Normal, Low or High.
Aggregating the traffic over set intervals, rather than mark-
ing individual packets, helps circumvent the potential prob-
lem of unmanageably large logs. This would, for example,
help avoid attack scenario 2 in Section 3, whereby an at-
tacker launches a DoS attack to mask a more targeted at-
tack.
4.2.2 Time anomaly detection
One common feature of certain ICS processes is that they
can occur at relatively fixed, predictable times. For example,
in the water industry there may be an otherwise unusually
high number of Write packets turning on pumps every day
at roughly 9pm, accounting for increased demand within the
supplied area. If, however, a similar increase was observed
at 4am, it could be seen as unusual. This extra heuristic
analysis allows more nuance in the marking of quantity; it
allows the system to decide if a given quantity marking is
in itself usual or unusual for the time period at which it is
occurring. This heuristic is, therefore, applied to a certain
time interval (e.g., the interval 20:30 might encapsulate all
Figure 2: Overview of SENAMI
times between 20:30 and 20:39), as opposed to the exact
time at which a packet occurs.
The aggregated packet information from the quantity anomaly
detection stage (marked as either Low, Normal or High quan-
tity) is then compared against heuristics for time. The sys-
tem can allocate a suspicion level, based around whether
this quantity is usual for the given time interval.
In our current implementation of SENAMI, a more basic
proof-of-concept version of this idea is given. For the sake of
testing the solution, it is not feasible to observe time anoma-
lies on a 24 hour cycle. The system, therefore, looks at 5
minute intervals within an hour (00, 05, 10, etc.) and de-
cides whether this behaviour is normal for that time. This
is done per packet type and per IP address endpoint.
4.2.3 IP anomaly detection
As previously noted, each instance of SENAMI is only
concerned with communications to and from the individual
PLC it monitors, as opposed to communications between
all devices on the network. Similarly to how there are time
periods during which we expect certain packets, and their
associated quantities, there exists a set of IP addresses from
which the PLC expects packets. In an ICS environment,
communicating components are largely always on; compo-
nents are unlikely to change IP addresses. As such, commu-
nication from a device that the system has not previously
observed would be considered suspicious. Likewise, commu-
nication from an IP address already on the network, which
does not normally Write to a PLC, could indicate a potential
attack.
4.2.4 PLC logic code upload detection
Upload of PLC logic code is a potentially dangerous re-
connaissance step undertaken by an attacker [18]. However,
it also forms a legitimate action that an ICS engineer would
carry out. It is, therefore, important to characterise whether
or not such uploads are anomalous. For example, if a logic
upload comes from an IP address that is not normally asso-
ciated with this action, it would be considered an alert. This
does have the potential for false positives however. If an ICS
engineer in charge of maintaining PLC logic is doing a legiti-
mate upload, but has recently changed their IP address, this
would flag an alert. However, this over-sensitivity is neces-
sary to detect potentially covert attack vectors. Further-
more, simple passive heuristics can detect such attacks at
their earliest ingress, as the code is uploaded to an attacking
node, while remaining computationally inexpensive. This
is in contrast with some active monitoring approaches [2],
which require the mapping of device memory, allowing for
monitoring of changes in logic and values, resulting in high
computational expense.
4.3 Active monitoring for value tampering
SENAMI takes a selective approach, actively monitoring
only three PLC variables in our initial proof of concept. The
selected variables have a context-specific purpose that make
their monitoring useful to the detection of value tampering.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the variables monitored are the
104th Double Word (MD104), the 3rd Double Word of Data
Block 1 (DB1), and the 3rd Double Word of Data Block 2
(DB2). MD104 is chosen as a reference point, as it can be
reasonably assumed that it is a legitimate value – unless an
attacker tampers physically with the PLC, which is out of
the scope of this paper. DB1 and DB2 are monitored since
these two hold key values that are used by the rest of the
infrastructure for observation and control purposes.
4.3.1 Inside the PLC
An analogue input (4-20mA) value is taken from a hard-
ware input card and stored in a Peripheral Input Word
(PIW). This raw analogue input value is converted to a more
meaningful digital range (0-100), and is stored in MD104.
Figure 3: Diagram of internal PLC configuration, where far left represents direct raw input from the PLC’s
input card and far right indicates executed actions. The dotted arrows represent the rate at which the
highlighted section refreshes.
This operation takes place multiple times per second. It is
reasonable to assume the integrity of MD104 as the true in-
put value. The value is overwritten too frequently for an
attacker to noticeably tamper with it without either (1) get-
ting direct physical access to the PLC and tampering with
its firmware or (2) overriding the PLC’s logic, which are two
attack scenarios that we consider out of scope for this study.
The MD104 value is moved into both DB1 and DB2. DB1
is a block of memory used by the PLC to determine what
action to take with regards to physical process operations.
DB2 provides a single centralised monitoring source, used to
inform the local RTU and Historian of current process states.
The RTU will analyse this data, and where necessary, relay
critical alarms to remote monitoring centres. Operators will
interpret generated alarms and respond accordingly.
The value from MD104 is copied into DB1 and DB2 every
5 seconds. This delay is applied due to the number of pro-
cesses managed by the PLC. As a quicker refresh rate is not
required, resources can be reserved for additional functions,
avoiding any computational overload. However, the refresh
of values is now suitably slow for an attacker to achieve suc-
cessful manipulation.
This separation of MD104 into two distinct locations in
DB1 and DB2 presents a vulnerability, as an attacker can
overwrite DB1 with a malicious Write function to, for exam-
ple, fill a water tank beyond safe limits, while overwriting
DB2 with a value indicating that the water level is normal.
The remote operator would then see a falsified value, and
be unaware of the real process state.
This practice of using two separate values is for a separa-
tion of duties, with distinct areas allocated for operational
process decision making, and simple monitoring. This can
also act as a safety feature. Due to the number of devices ac-
cessing operational data, a single misconfigured component
inadvertently writing to a DB, rather than reading from it,
would only impact monitoring, leaving the critical process
unaffected. What may appear a significant security over-
sight at first glance, is, in actuality, a design choice derived
from safety concerns and centralisation of external requests
from monitoring devices.
4.3.2 Selective active monitoring
The active monitoring component of SENAMI consists
of checking the difference in values between MD104 (what
should actually be happening), DB1 (what is actually hap-
pening) and DB2 (what operators are being told is happen-
ing): any difference would reveal a tampering. It is impor-
tant to note that this detection relies on the assumption that
the attacker has not had physical access to the PLC: in case
the firmware were compromised, the value in MD104 itself
(i.e. our reference point) could be tampered with.
As such, SENAMI can actively request values frequently.
To avoid any potential strain on the PLCs, SENAMI can be
configured with polling intervals (e.g., every 5 seconds). The
active monitoring component of SENAMI has, therefore, a
limited disruptive impact on its target by limiting both the
number of monitored variables (3 out of several dozens) and
the frequency of this monitoring (every few seconds). How-
ever, it is also important to note this scenario is based on a
case study in [11], monitoring only one critical operational
value. Should two operational values require monitoring, we
would need to compare six values in total.
For additional completeness, our future work (see sec-
tion 6.3.3) will seek to include the RAW PIW (see Figure 3)
value as part of this comparison.
5. EVALUATION
5.1 Overview of the Testbed
Two existing works provide a comprehensive overview of
Lancaster University’s ICS testbed[10, 20]. For reference,
field site three, as described in [20], provides the platform
for experimentation here.
SENAMI’s passive element requires visibility of traffic pass-
ing to and from the monitored PLC. This is achieved through
use of port mirroring on a network switch, responsible for
interconnecting all devices within the network. In addition
to passive monitoring, SENAMI also requires an appropri-
ate connectivity for its active monitoring component. This
is achieved through the use of a secondary connection be-
tween SENAMI and a standard port (non-mirrored) on the
same network switch (cf. Figure 1).
5.2 Experiments and results
We evaluated the effectiveness of SENAMI with regards
to the detection of various ICS attacks. Based on the attack
scenarios established in section 3:
• Scenario 1: reconnaissance (passive threat)
• Scenario 2: DoS (passive threat)
• Scenario 3: logic exfiltration (passive threat)
• Scenario 4.1: tampering via the network (active and
passive threat)
• Scenario 4.2: tampering via PLC compromise (active
threat)
• Scenario 4.3: partial tampering via PLC compromise
(active threat)
Specifically, we ran the following experiments:
• Session 1: Passive detection of passive threats (scenar-
ios 1, 2, 3 and 4.1)
• Session 2: Passive detection of combined passive and
active threats (scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4.1 and 4.2)
• Session 3: Active detection of active threats (scenarios
4.1 and 4.2)
• Session 4: Active detection of more advanced active
threats combined with passive threats (scenarios 2, 4.1
and 4.3)
For each of these experiments, we present the True Neg-
ative (TN), True Positive (TP), False Negative (FN) and
False Positive (FP) numbers. From these we compute the
corresponding Recall or True Positive Rate (R = TPR =
TP
TP+FN
), Precision (P = TP
TP+FP
), False Positive Rate (FPR
= FP
FP+TN
) and F-Measure (F = 2 R.P
R+P
). Table 1 shows the
results of all sessions, Figure 4 summarises the Precision,
Recall and F-Measure and Figure 5 presents a receiver op-
erating characteristic (ROC) plot showing the TPR against
the FPR.
5.2.1 Passive detection of passive threats
These experiments included only passive threats (unau-
thorised writes, suspicious logic uploads, fuzzing, DoS at-
tacks, etc.), as well as legitimate actions mimicking general
network activity.
Session 1.1.
The activity carried out in this session included:
• Scenario 3: suspicious and legitimate logic code up-
loads.
• Scenario 4.1: writes coming either from legitimate or
suspicious IPs, at either legitimate or suspicious times.
Session 1.2.
The activity carried out in this session was similar to that
of session 1.1, with the inclusion of more non-S7 attack traf-
fic:
• Scenario 1: use of plcscan [6] for reconnaissance.
• Scenarios 2 and 3: suspicious logic uploads while car-
rying out either a DoS attack or both a DoS and a
fuzzing attack.
• Scenario 3: suspicious and legitimate logic code up-
loads.
• Scenario 4.1: tampering via write packets coming ei-
ther from legitimate or suspicious IPs, at either legiti-
mate or suspicious times.
The False Negative generated here was due to the use of
plcscan coming from a legitimate IP address, and being a
lightweight enough activity that it did not generate a high
quantity of traffic to warrant an alert. Therefore, it went
undetected.
5.2.2 Passive detection of combined passive and ac-
tive threats
Next, SENAMI (running in passive mode) is tested against
a combination of passive and active threats. These are tested
for both attackers with suspicious IPs and more covert ones
with legitimate IPs.
Session 2.1.
The activity carried out in this session included:
• Scenario 2: DoS and fuzzing attacks.
• Scenarios 2 and 3: logic code uploads while fuzzing.
• Scenario 4.1: tampering via write packets coming from
either legitimate or suspicious IPs, at either legitimate
or suspicious times.
• Scenarios 2 and 4.1: value tampering and a DoS attack
to attempt to disguise partial value tampering.
Due to the use of suspicious IPs, an alert is generated
when carrying out the value tampering. However, it is flagged
only for its suspicious IP and high number of Write packets,
effectively discarding it as an S7 DoS attack, and missing
the true, more potentially dangerous, intentions behind it.
Therefore, the alert generated for this should be considered
a False Positive. Likewise, partial tampering cannot be reli-
ably detected, and is sometimes flagged as a High alert (as a
DoS), sometimes as a Medium alert, and sometimes remains
entirely undetected.
Session 2.2.
The activity carried out in this session mirrored that of
session 2.1, with the additional introduction of legitimate
IP addresses in place of the suspicious ones used for value
tampering.
A number of False Negatives arise here from the now
somewhat legitimised traffic of an attacker, highlighting a
fundamental challenge in that it can be difficult to identify
malicious insiders (not in the scope of this paper). This
demonstrates the requirement for strict observation. Again,
value tampering was often either ignored or misclassified as
a DoS-like alert (sometimes even as low an alert level as
Medium).
5.2.3 Active detection of active threats
Operating in active mode, these evaluation sessions fo-
cused on SENEMI’s ability to detect active value tamper-
ing. Passive attacks are included in the following sessions.
However, due to the already established strength of passive
detection on passive threats, they are not the core focus.
Figure 4: Summary of Recall, Precision and F-Measure for all experiments. Note the truncated Y axis.
Figure 5: ROC values (TPR against FPR) for all sessions. Note the truncated X and Y axis.
Session 1.1 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 119 FP = 0
Positive Cases FN = 0 TP = 9
Session 1.2 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 217 FP = 0
Positive Cases FN = 1 TP = 18
Session 2.1 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 131 FP = 3
Positive Cases FN = 1 TP = 13
Session 2.2 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 117 FP = 4
Positive Cases FN = 5 TP = 5
Session 3.1 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 117 FP = 1
Positive Cases FN = 0 TP = 9
Session 3.2.1 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 187 FP = 3
Positive Cases FN = 0 TP = 9
Session 3.2.2 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 148 FP = 1
Positive Cases FN = 0 TP = 10
Session 4.1.1 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 187 FP = 1
Positive Cases FN = 5 TP = 3
Session 4.1.2 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 144 FP = 1
Positive Cases FN = 4 TP = 5
Session 4.2.1 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 140 FP = 1
Positive Cases FN = 4 TP = 10
Session 4.2.2 Predicted Negative Predicted Positive
Negative Cases TN = 116 FP = 3
Positive Cases FN = 6 TP = 11
Table 1: Session results.
Session 3.1.
The activity carried out in this session included:
• Scenario 4.1: unauthorised writes at an unusual time
• Scenario 4.1: unauthorised writes at a normal time
• Scenario 4.1: multiple instances of value tampering
All of this was carried out from a suspicious IP address.
Session 3.2.
Attackers are likely to compromise, and therefore have
access to, a legitimate IP address. The same actions as
session 3.1 were carried out, but from legitimate IPs. These
tests were carried out multiple times, to demonstrate the
changeable – but overall reliable – detection of this active
attack from legitimate IP addresses. Values from two of the
tests are shown in Table 1 as session 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
5.2.4 Active detection of advanced active threats
The final evaluation scenario introduced less typical, more
selective, active threats. Specifically, we evaluated SENAMI
against a compromised PLC whose control logic would over-
ride its own values (scenario 4.2). In the second session, the
attacker combines a decoy DoS attack attempting to mask
value tampering activities, while using partial tampering to
avoid the timed detection window of SENAMI.
Session 4.1.
This evaluation session included partial tampering (sce-
nario 4.3). Partial tampering is difficult to detect, as demon-
strated by the results shown. Due to the unpredictable na-
ture of detection for this attack, the scores of two tests are
shown in Table 1.
Session 4.2.
The final evaluation scenario involved detecting a mix of
full value tampering (scenario 4.1), and partial value tam-
pering (scenario 4.3), while also under a DoS attack (sce-
nario 2). This test also introduced the idea of using a large
scale value tampering attack itself as a DoS, to mask a more
selective and lightweight writing attack to a specific area.
The results are given as 2 tests shown in Table 1.
The full value tampering attack was reliably detected (lead-
ing to the generally high Precision score). Partial tampering
was only detected around a third of the time in these tests
(leading to the lower Recall score).
The value tampering disguised by a DoS was detected
quite simply. Using full-scale value tampering as a DoS-like
attack encompassed the selective writes carried out at the
same time, and meant no alerts were generated for the lat-
ter. A Critical alert would be generated for the offending
IP, while its true intention may remain hidden. This is a
weakness in the active monitoring. However, it still draws
a considerable amount of attention to the attacker. Fur-
thermore, launching such an attack requires a number of
assumed factors: a compromised legitimate IP, a high level
of insider knowledge on the working of both the ICS network
and of the IDS itself.
6. DISCUSSION
6.1 Significance of results
SENAMI achieves its best results, with a high recall and
precision (F-Measure > 0.97, cf. Figure 4), when using pas-
sive detection techniques against passive threats (sessions
1.1 and 1.2). The passive component of SENAMI, there-
fore, demonstrates that an entire range of threats can be
countered with a high confidence via completely unintru-
sive, passive monitoring techniques.
Active detection of active threats (sessions 3.1, 3.2.1 and
3.2.2) showcase no True Negatives (perfect recall of 1.0 in
each session, cf. Figure 4) and a fair Precision. The ac-
tive component of SENAMI can, therefore, systematically
detect active threats, at the cost of occasional False Posi-
tives. In comparison, the detection of active threats with
passive monitoring (sessions 2.1 and 2.2) is less effective (F-
Measures of 0.87 and 0.53 respectively, cf. Figure 4).
The results of sessions 4.* show the cost of SENAMI to
attackers: more sophisticated attacks (partial tampering,
combined tampering, and decoy DoS) are necessary to avoid
detection. While we acknowledge there is room for improve-
ment in SENAMI, even in its prototype form, the additional
investment required from an attacker’s perspective is signif-
icant.
6.2 Consilience of passive and active monitor-
ing
Our experience with SENAMI highlights that neither ac-
tive nor passive monitoring can address the challenges of
ICS intrusion detection in isolation. The notion of selective,
non-invasive, active monitoring is borne out of the need for
combining these approaches so that the low computational
overheads of a passive approach can be fully harnessed while
enriching it with active monitoring of a small set of con-
textualised variables that do not overload legacy PLCs or
compromise real-time properties of an ICS. One interesting
avenue to explore is that of more advanced passive monitor-
ing solutions, for example, those based on safe value ranges
(or patterns of such ranges) and whether such an approach
can further reduce the amount of active monitoring required
to mitigate advanced attacks, such as the ones in sessions
4.*.
6.3 Future Work
A number of questions remain open for exploration.
6.3.1 How selective should active monitoring be?
The choice of polling rates (e.g., 5 seconds) and monitored
values (MD104, DB1, DB2) in SENAMI are somewhat arbi-
trary and rooted in our knowledge of ICS architectures and
well-known attacks. These choices heuristically determine
how selective SENAMI is: the less intensive the monitoring,
the less strain is put on the target PLC, the more likely an
attack could be missed a priori. In this paper we present
good detection rates while imposing no visible strain on the
target PLC, compared to existing active approaches [19].
However, a stronger theoretical background, backed up by
additional experiments, is necessary to precisely determine
the trade-offs in terms of precision vs. computational and
network overhead in the choice of polling rates and moni-
tored values. In future work, we will explore the influence of
variable polling rates and values monitoring on the efficiency
and effectiveness of SENAMI.
6.3.2 How is the approach affected by different tech-
nologies?
At the moment, SENAMI focuses only on SIMATIC PLCs
using the S7 protocol. The influence of the network stack
and the PLCs themselves on the reliability of SENAMI is
an open question. Lancaster’s testbed offers a wide variety
of alternative constructors and protocols [10]: future work
will investigate similar scenarios in different technological
contexts.
6.3.3 PIW Monitoring
To provide wider, more comprehensive applicability and
accuracy, the active component should include monitoring of
RAW PIW values. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly,
as previously noted, the MD value could in theory be subject
to tampering. We believe tampering of the RAW PIW value
would likely pose a greater challenge to attackers, especially
where subtle modifications were the end goal. Secondly, the
practice of data separation based on function (DB1 for pro-
cess decision making, and DB2 for monitoring) may not be
applied in other scenarios, whereas the use of conversions be-
tween RAW values and meaningful REAL values is common
place. Therefore, through the comparison of PIW against
MD and/or DB addressing, our approach would be more
widely applicable.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented SENAMI, an IDS featuring
both passive monitoring and selective, non-invasive, active
monitoring. SENAMI avoids introducing computational and
network overhead by polling a limited number of contex-
tualised variables from its target. The combination of ac-
tive and passive monitoring allows the detection of a range
of attacks, including combined attacks involving decoys, as
demonstrated by a number of experiments.
Although the approach taken in SENAMI constitutes a
step forward in active intrusion detection compared to the
state of the art, our experience with SENAMI’s implemen-
tation and its evaluation has also uncovered a number of
future research directions. The choice of polling rates and
target values is key to performing efficient yet effective in-
trusion detection. Our future work will focus on refining
the current heuristics. The diversity of target equipments is
another challenge to be overcome: Lancaster’s testbed diver-
sity will be exploited in that regard as we refine and expand
the implementation of SENAMI to cover a wider range of
devices and protocols.
8. SOURCE CODE FOR SENAMI
The SENAMI source code is freely accessible on github:
https://github.com/WilliamJardine/SENAMI.
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